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Bertsch v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 33, (June 22, 2017)1 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 
Summary 
  
 To sue a court-appointed master who has quasi-judicial immunity, an individual must seek 
leave of the appointing court.  This includes court-appointed forensic accountants who were acting 




Real party in interest Jay Bloom sued Larry L. Bertsch and Larry L. Bertsch CPA & 
Associates (collectively, Bertsch) for Bertsch’s actions as court-appointed special master in a 
previous lawsuit in which Bloom was the defendant.  Bertsch provided forensic accounting 
services for the district court and the court provided him qualified immunity.  
 
Before Bertsch filed his final report, plaintiff’s counsel disclosed that it previously 
represented Bertsch in another matter.  In Bertsch’s final report, he stated that “certain companies 
associated with Bloom had the ‘earmarks of a Ponzi scheme’.”  Bloom filed a motion to disqualify 
plaintiff’s counsel, alleging a conflict of interest with Bertsch.  When Bloom initiated discovery, 
Bertsch moved for a protective order, which the district court granted in part, while ordering that 
Bertsch and plaintiff’s counsel produce communications.  Bloom argued that Bertsch’s report was 
biased, and requested that the court strike the report and issue sanctions.  Bertsch opposed the 
motion and argued that his communications with plaintiff’s counsel were proper and routine.  The 
district court found that Bertsch should have disclosed his prior attorney-client relationship with 
plaintiff’s counsel, but that it did not merit disqualification because the conflict no longer existed 
at the time Bloom objected, and Bloom failed to take any earlier action to prevent Bertsch from 
issuing his report.   
 
The court accepted the report, but declined to adopt the findings as conclusions of law or 
analyze the findings.  Additionally, the district court found that Bertsch, as a special master under 
NRCP 53, had the same immunities from discovery as a judge, and that only non-privileged 
communications regarding the report were discoverable.  The case settled and Bertsch was never 
deposed. Bloom then filed a complaint against Bertsch for gross negligence, fraudulent 
concealment, willful misconduct, and defamation.  Bertsch filed a motion to dismiss, arguing in 
part absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit.  The district court denied the motion to dismiss 
finding that Bertsch was only entitled to qualified immunity. Bertsch petitioned the Nevada 
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, arguing that he had quasi-judicial immunity because of 
language in the order that appointed him special master.  Bertsch also argued that Bloom’s 
complaint is jurisdictionally improper, because Bloom did not seek leave of the court that 




Standard for writ relief 
																																																						
1  By Sydney Campau. 
The Nevada Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to grant extraordinary writ relief.2  
The Court rarely grants writ relief because there is generally another remedy available, and writ 
relief is costly and disruptive for the district court.3  However, the Court has discretion to grant 
writ relief to clarify an important issue of law, and when it is in the interest of judicial economy.4  
The Court exercised its discretion because Bertsch’s claims raised important legal issues requiring 
the Court’s clarification. 
 
Bloom was required to seek leave of the appointing court prior to filing a separate 
complaint against Bertsch 
 
The Court found that Bertsch should have raised his jurisdictional challenge in his opening 
brief.  Nonetheless, the Court chose to consider the issue, which it inferred from Bertsch’s oral 
argument, because it was in the interest of justice.  Bertsch’s argument implicates the Barton 
doctrine, which is a federal common law rule that requires a party to obtain leave from a 
bankruptcy court before suing a trustee for their official actions.  In Int’l Game Tech., Inc. v. Sec. 
Jud. Dist. Ct., the Court considered whether the Barton doctrine should apply to all court-
appointed officers.5  The Barton doctrine’s purpose is to prevent frivolous lawsuits and to protect 
officials performing their court-appointed duties, because exposure to liability could influence a 
court-appointed professional’s decision to accept their appointment, or could affect their 
recommendations.  The Court held that Bertsch played an integral role in the judicial process, and 
was required to use discretionary judgment to evaluate records and assist in making determinations 
of law and fact.  Thus, the Court extended the Barton doctrine to court-appointed accountants in 
the capacity of special master, and held that an individual must seek leave of the appointing court 
to sue a court-appointed special master. 
  
The appointing court determined that Bertsch did not act outside the scope of his court-
derived duties 
 
 Bertsch should have disclosed his prior attorney-client relationship under NCJC 2.11(C).  
However, the district court did not find this to be grounds for disqualification, finding that Bertsch 




 Bertsch did not act beyond the scope of his court-derived duties, and Bloom was required 
to file a motion with the appointing court in order to sue Bertsch.  Thus, the Court granted Bertsch’s 
petition and issued a writ of mandamus directing the district court to dismiss the underlying 
complaint against Bertsch. 
 
																																																						
2  Mountain View Hosp., Inc. v. Eight Jud. Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. 180, 184, 273 P.3d 861, 864 (2012). 
3  124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558–59 (2008). 
4  Id. at 197–98, 179 P.3d at 559. 
5  Blixseth v. Brown, 470 B.R. 562, 567 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2012).	
